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Rene Kirkegaard
Rene Kirkegaard
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Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps
R Kirkegaard
Games and Economic Behavior 76 (1), 226-248, 2012
1372012
A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
R Kirkegaard
Econometrica 80 (5), 2349-2364, 2012
822012
Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands
R Kirkegaard, PB Overgaard
The RAND Journal of Economics 39 (3), 770-789, 2008
612008
Asymmetric first price auctions
R Kirkegaard
Journal of Economic Theory 144 (4), 1617-1635, 2009
602009
A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
R Kirkegaard
Theoretical Economics 12 (1), 25-51, 2017
422017
Using economic theory to guide numerical analysis: Solving for equilibria in models of asymmetric first-price auctions
TP Hubbard, R Kirkegaard, HJ Paarsch
Computational Economics 42, 241-266, 2013
342013
A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
R Kirkegaard
Economic Theory 28, 449-452, 2006
332006
Buy-out prices in online auctions: multi-unit demand
R Kirkegaard, PB Overgaard
University of Aarhus Economics Working Paper, 2003
312003
Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders
R Kirkegaard
European Economic Review 64, 98-110, 2013
232013
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
R Kirkegaard, PB Overgaard
Games and Economic Behavior 63 (1), 145-165, 2008
192008
Auctions versus negotiations revisited
R Kirkegaard
Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, 2004
192004
Ranking asymmetric auctions using the dispersive order
R Kirkegaard
Unpublished Manuscript, University of Guelph, 2011
172011
Asymmetric auctions with more than two bidders
TP Hubbard, R Kirkegaard
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, 2015
122015
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
R Kirkegaard
Games and Economic Behavior 102, 373-387, 2017
102017
Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
R Kirkegaard
Games and Economic Behavior 85, 60-69, 2014
102014
Comparative statics and welfare in heterogeneous all-pay auctions: bribes, caps, and performance thresholds
R Kirkegaard
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 0000102202193517041417, 2008
92008
Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers
R Kirkegaard
Economics Letters 89 (3), 328-332, 2005
92005
Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests
R Kirkegaard
International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (3), 261-266, 2013
82013
Bid-separation in asymmetric auctions
TP Hubbard, R Kirkegaard
Working Paper, 2019
72019
Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All $ Pay Auction
R Kirkegaard
Unpublished results, 2010
72010
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