| Maximizing non-monotone submodular set functions subject to different constraints: Combined algorithms S Fadaei, MA Fazli, MA Safari Operations research letters 39 (6), 447-451, 2011 | 16 | 2011 |
| Generalized Assignment Problem: Truthful Mechanism Design without Money S Fadaei arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.04273v1, 0 | 15* | |
| Fast convex decomposition for truthful social welfare approximation D Kraft, S Fadaei, M Bichler Web and Internet Economics: 10th International Conference, WINE 2014 …, 2014 | 14 | 2014 |
| Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders S Fadaei, M Bichler International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 235-246, 2016 | 12 | 2016 |
| A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem S Fadaei, M Bichler arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.1703, 2014 | 10 | 2014 |
| Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets S Fadaei, M Bichler European Journal of Operational Research 260 (2), 767-777, 2017 | 7 | 2017 |
| Mechanism design via dantzig-wolfe decomposition S Fadaei arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.04250, 2015 | 5 | 2015 |
| Maximizing submodular set functions subject to different constraints: Combined algorithms S Fadaei, S MohammadAli, F MohammadAmin CoRR abs/1101.2973, 2011 | 3 | 2011 |
| Truthfulness with Value-Maximizing Bidders S Fadaei, M Bichler arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.03821, 2016 | 1 | 2016 |
| Truthful combinatorial assignment without money S Fadaei, M Bichler Int. Conf. Operations Res., Vienna, Austria, 2015 | 1 | 2015 |
| A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms M Bichler, S Fadaei, D Kraft Computers & Operations Research 103, 277-287, 2019 | | 2019 |
| Algorithmic Mechanism Design via Relaxation and Rounding S Fadaei Technische Universität München, 2016 | | 2016 |
| Fast Convex Decomposition for Algorithmic Mechanism Design M Bichler, S Fadaei, D Kraft | | |
| A Note on Relaxation and Rounding in Algorithmic Mechanism Design S Fadaei arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.04768, 0 | | |
| Truthful Mechanism Design without Money: No Upward Bidding S Fadaei, M Bichler | | |
Martin BichlerProfessor of Computer Science, Technical University of MunichVerified email at in.tum.de
